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THE EFFECT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON AIRLINE




A. DEREGULATION REDUCED AIRLINE FAREs
WATHIN A FEW years of the passage of the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978, a number of studies began to provide em-
pirical evidence of the impact of deregulation in terms of fare
reductions.' A 1982 report by the Civil Aeronautics Board, for
example, found that average passenger yields had fallen by 22%,
relative to the Standard Industry Fare Level ("SIFL"), which
would have been authorized had regulation continued.2 A 1990
report by the Department of Transportation ("DOT") found
that inflation-adjusted yields declined from 9.0 cents per passen-
ger-mile to 7.6 cents from 1979 to 1988.' The Committee for
the Study of Air Passenger Service and Safety reported in their
seminal 1991 Winds of Change report, published by the Transpor-
tation Research Board, that inflation-adjusted airline fares fell
* The authors are grateful for insightful comments from Darin Lee, Severin
Borenstein and Martin Dresner. The views in this paper and any errors are the
responsibility of the authors. The authors are Executive Vice President & Chief
Economist, and Director, Economic Analysis with Inter VISTAS Consulting Inc.,
Vancouver Canada. Tretheway is also Adjunct Professor at the University of
British Columbia, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration. The
authors can be contacted at Mike Tretheway@InterVISTAS.com. An earlier
draft of this paper was originally submitted by Tretheway to the Australian
Competition Tribunal on behalf of Qantas and Air New Zealand.
I Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1979).
2 See generally DAVID R. GAIIAM & DANIEL P. KAPLAN, COMPETITION AND THE
AIRLINES: AN EVALUATION OF DEREGULATION (1982) (noting that fares rose imme-
diately following deregulation, in part due to an almost tripling of fuel prices
with the 1979 oil crisis. Most researchers compared changes in average fares or
yields to changes in either the SIFL or to an index of airline costs).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION IN TIE U.S.
DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY [PRICING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] 7 (1990).
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by an average 16% from 1979 to 1989 and by 25% from 1982 to
1989, after the second oil crisis.4
B. SOME MARKETS HAD HIGHER FARES
While deregulation's overall impact on air fares was being
hailed a success, researchers began to observe that the impact of
deregulation on air fares was distributed unequally among
routes.5 An early finding was that, while fares declined on long
and medium-haul routes, they rose in short-haul markets, some-
times dramatically.' This result was not surprising, as the regu-
lated era had intentionally suppressed short-haul fares relative
to costs, and an adjustment was widely expected.7
Of greater concern was a finding that fares tended to be
higher on routes from those hub airports where one carrier had
a "dominant" share of flights." While not the first researcher to
make this observation,9 Borenstein's 1989 paper is often cited.' 0
He found that a carrier with a 50% market share at both
endpoints of a route sustained a fare, on average, 12% higher
than a carrier with only a 10% market share at each endpoint."
Borenstein's study was rapidly followed by a series of other stud-
ies examining the impact of industry concentration on average
fares paid by consumers, specifically, concentration at the newly
emerging fortress hubs of the major air carriers. 12 In 1990, the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") found that air fares were
27% higher at fifteen concentrated hub airports than fares at
4 TRANsp. RESEARCH BD., WINDS OF CHANGE: DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT SINCE
DEREGULATION--SPECIAL REPORT 230 (1990). The previous references were
based on system-wide yields (average revenue per passenger-mile) whereas the
Winds of Change report used data on average fare levels (revenue per passenger)
for individual routes.
5 See, e.g., STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
AIRLINE DEREGULATION 24-25 (1986) [hereinafter ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE
DEREGULATION].
6 Id.
7 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: HIGHER FARES AND RE-
DUCED COMPETITION AT CONCENTRATED AIRPORTS 21-22 (1990).
8 Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the
U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RAND J. ECONS. 344, 344-45, 355 (1989).
9 GRAHAM & KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 195 (observing that "fares in monopoly
markets are higher than those in relatively unconcentrated markets . . .").
10 Borenstein, supra note 8; see also Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, Compe-
tition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry, 102J. POL. ECON. 653 (1994)
(describing the effect of factors such as market concentration on the variation in
fares charged by air carriers).
11 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 360.
12 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7.
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thirty-eight unconcentrated airports.'" Given that a series of air-
line mergers had been authorized from 1985 to 1987, these em-
pirical findings raised major public policy concerns.' 4 These
concerns continue to the present as bankruptcies and the loss of
market share to aggressive low-cost carriers have led the major
network air carriers in the United States and elsewhere to seek
mergers or alliances. '
5
While early research found "hub premiums," a series of pa-
pers began to reveal that the issue was not so simple, and that
market concentration, by itself, did not have an effect as high as
the observed hub premium.' 6 Hub markets have innate charac-
teristics that would lead to higher fares, even without concentra-
tion. 17 Hub cities, for example, have a higher proportion of
businesses, which generates demand for flexible, last-minute air
travel and creates a greater willingness to pay a premium for
high-frequency service with flexible ticket conditions."i Flights
from hub cities also tend to be shorter than flights on compari-
son routes. Because costs per mile decrease with longer route
distances, route economics would suggest the shorter-distance
routes from hub cities would have somewhat higher fares.
C. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LITERATURE
A rich body of literature has emerged that explores the im-
pact of market structure on average fares paid by airline con-
sumers.'" This literature has provided a greater degree of
understanding of how various market forces and cost conditions
interact in determining airline prices.20 In addition to showing
how simple measures of hub premiums can distort the effect of
market structure on airline fares, the literature has revealed how
13 Id. at 3.
14 Id. at 31.
15 Id.
16 Wissam Abunassar & Kenneth Koford, A Re-estimation of the Air Transport Asso-
ciation Study of Airline Fares & Study of Airline Fares and Concentration, 30 LOGISTICS
& TRANSP. REV. 363, 369 (1994); STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 46 (1995) [hereinafter THE EVOLUTION OF
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY].
17 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 5, at 62.
18 Id. at 181 (describing flexible ticket conditions such as the ability to change
plans without penalty, the ability to obtain a full refund, and the ability to
purchase the ticket close to the date of flight, rather than in advance).
19 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulation Markets: Theoy, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REC. 393, 411-12 (1987).
20 Abunassar & Koford, supra note 16.
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the impact has changed over time as the industry has restruc-
tured and evolved. Discovering the impact of low-cost carriers
("LCCs") on prices in airline markets, including markets not di-
rectly served by LCCs, was especially important to the litera-
ture's evolution.21
The purpose of this paper is to review the literature concern-
ing the impact of market structure on airline fares. And as will
be seen, the literature has evolved over the past fifteen years.22
Understanding this evolution is important, because decisions
based on selected early papers in the field could lead to errone-
ous public policy.23 At a time of industry consolidation, re-
trenchment and attempts at cross-border airline mergers (such
as the recent Air France-KLM transaction), understanding the
nuances of the effect of concentration on market outcomes is of
considerable importance.24
Section II of the paper examines the initial literature on hub
premiums. 25 It shows how the literature gradually came to ap-
preciate that factors other than market concentration contrib-
uted to the observed higher fares at dominated hubs.26 Section
III looks at the impact of LCCs on average fares. The hub domi-
nance research began to reveal anomalies such as little or no
hub premium for those routes or hubs served by the original
successful LCC, Southwest Airlines. 27 Research indicated that
the fare-reducing effect was not unique to Southwest and that
this generalized LCC effect was larger than the hub premium,
leading to continued research. 21 Section IV looks at factors af-
fecting entry by air carriers onto routes. If LCCs significantly
reduce fares in airline markets, then understanding how and
when LCCs enter markets is of critical importance.29 Section V
looks at the related topic of incumbent response to LCC entry.
While this literature is young, it is likely to generate additional
interest, as authorities in the United States, Canada, Australia
21 Simat, Hellieson & Eichner, Hub Operations: An Analysis of Airline Hub
and Spoke Systems Since Deregulation, Address Before the Air Transportation
Association (May 1989).
22 Compare Levine, supra note 19, with Lee & Luengo-Prado, infra note 121.
23 Levine, supra note 19, at 395-96.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 19, at 396.
26 Borenstein, supra note 8. "
27 Abunassar & Koford, supra note 16, at 355.
28 Id.
29 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AVIATION & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
DOMINATED HUB FARES 2 (2001).
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and Europe have initiated anti-trust actions under their respec-
tive competition laws3 0
Section VI draws a set of conclusions and attempts a synthesis
of the literature regarding the impact of market structure on
airline fares. It also provides guidance for further research in
the field and suggests those areas where further research would
enrich our understanding of airline markets. The appendix
that follows lists the forty-nine papers and reports reviewed in
this survey and provides brief descriptions of their methodology
and key results.
II. HUB PREMIUMS
A. EARLY STUDIES - SIMPLE COMPARISONS FOUND
HUB PREMIUMS
While limited hub-and-spoke route systems existed in the
United States prior to deregulation, the pre-existing air carriers
quickly reorganized their routes into such systems after deregu-
lation.31 As stated by Levine in 1987:
Yet another striking feature of deregulated airline markets has
been the nearly universal emergence of the "hub and spoke" sys-
tem as the route structure of choice for deregulated airlines....
Deregulated airlines have used hub and spoke systems almost ex-
clusively. . . . The emergence of hub and spoke systems has reas-
sured airlines concerned about survival and has worried
competition-oriented analysts for the same reason. Hub and
spoke systems seem to provide some protection from new entry
and hence some market power at the hub city, power which is
enhanced when the hubbing airline also operates the dominant
computer reservation system at the hub.32
In many instances, the hub airports became highly concen-
trated, with one or two airlines providing most of the service
from the hub airport.3 A concern arose that this concentration
allowed the dominant airlines to raise fares on flights to and
30 Steven Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Com-
petition, 80 AM. ECON. Rrv. 391 (1990) [hereinafter Dynamics of Airline Pricing and
Competition]; H. Ito & D. Lee, Incumbent Responses to Lower Cost Entry: Evidence from
the U.S. Airline Industry, http://www.brown.edu/departments/economics/pa-
pers/2003/incumbent final.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
31 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 25.
32 Levine, supra note 19, at 411-12.
33 Id. at 412.
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from their hubs.34 To determine whether fares were higher at
concentrated airports, early research compared fares at concen-
trated hub airports with those at other airports, or they com-
pared fares before and after a merger resulting in airport
dominance. 5
In 1988, Huston and Butler conducted one of the first studies
in this area, examining the impact of the 1986 merger of TWA
and Ozark on service and average fares at their shared hub in St.
Louis.3 6 Huston & Butler's analysis compared fares and service
levels before and after the merger. They found that while hub
connectivity improved--the the number of destinations served
increased--fares charged by the merged airline also increased. 7
Fares to St. Louis increased by between 13 and 46%, while fares
through St. Louis increased by between 6 and 19%.Y1 The lower
fare increase on connecting flights was attributed to competi-
tion from other hubs for connecting traffic.3 9 The data set used
by Huston and Butler was the Department of Transportation
Data Base IA ("DBla"), a 10% sample of all domestic airline
tickets sold in the U.S.4 ° This disaggregate dataset consists of
34 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3. Note that airlines typi-
cally charge a range of prices in the market, with various types of restrictions on
access to the various prices. This pricing practice has elements of price discrimi-
nation as well as cost based product differentiation. Even without changing any
of the fares, by changing the number of seats available at a given price, airlines
can affect the average fare paid by its consumers. In this paper, the terms fare
and price are used interchangeably. As well, the phrase "raising fares" should be
seen as synonymous with increasing the average fare paid. The focus of the liter-
ature on the effect of concentration on airline fares has largely been on the aver-
age fare paid by the consumer (or the air carrier's yield), with little or no
attention as to how average fares changed, whether by changes in the actual
prices charged or by changing the number of seats sold at a given price. See
Levine, supra note 19, at 47677.
15 Richard V. Butler & John H. Huston, The Effects of Fortress Hubs on Airline
Fares and Service: The Early Returns, 24 LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REv. 203 (1988) (stat-
ing that it is generally believed that any hub premium applies mainly to routes
originating or terminating at the hub). Routes connecting through the hub may
benefit from competition from other hubs, so the hub airline may be unable to
charge a premium on connecting traffic.
36 Id. at 203 (examining the impact of the Northwest/Republic merger on ser-
vices levels, but not fares, at their hubs in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Detroit).
37 Id. at 205, 207-10.
38 Id. at 211-12.
39 Id. at 213.
40 Id. at 214 n.1. This databank contains a 10% sample of all tickets originating
in the United States on U.S. carriers, available on a quarterly basis (large air
carriers and their code share partners are required to submit survey data taken
directly from the airline ticket stub; smaller domestic scheduled carriers are ex-
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observations on individual airline tickets and is available quar-
terly. 4' This rich dataset was ideal for conducting studies of vari-
ous effects on air fares, and most subsequent research used the
data, although for increasingly expanded time periods.
In 1990, the GAO conducted another early study to quantify
the hub premium. 42 The study compared yields, equal to aver-
age revenue per passenger-mile, for trips originating at fifteen
hub airports dominated by one or two carriers to yields at thirty-
eight unconcentrated airports.43 The GAO's simple compara-
tive analysis concluded that yields at hub airports were 27.2%
higher.44 The GAO defined a hub as "dominated" if 60% of all
enplanements were by one carrier, or if 85% were by two carri-
ers.4 5 The same, or similar, definitions of hub dominance have
generally been adopted by subsequent researchers. 6 The GAO
study used the DBla database, but filtered out tickets that ap-
peared to be erroneously coded, such as those with exception-
ally high or low fares. 7 The GAO analysis was based on
comparisons of average yields, computed across whatever do-
mestic routes were served at the airports, without adjustment or
exclusion. 8
The DOT carried out a similar study of hub premiums in 1990
by again comparing yields at concentrated and unconcentrated
empt). The data contains information on total price paid, carrier, origin, desti-
nation, class of travel and routing. Several million observations are collected
each quarter making it one of the most comprehensive air ticket datasets availa-
ble. Some data cleaning is required due to entry errors and other problems.
Generally, most researchers exclude outlier airfares that are considered too high
or too low. The exact criteria varied between studies, although many use the
GAO filter, described shortly. In addition, most researchers excluded routes with
a small sample size, e.g., less than 100 observations per quarter.
41 Id.
42 U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 14. The GAO study also
reviewed a small number of other papers examining the hub premiums.
43 Id. at 15.
44 Id. at 32. The average fare at the fifteen concentrated hub airports, across
all airlines, was 27.2% higher than the average fare at the thirty-eight unconcen-
trated airports. Id. For the dominant carrier at the concentrated hub airports
the average fare was almost 38% higher. Id. at 3.
45 Id. at 15. It should be noted that not all researchers agree with this defini-
tion. Some argue that a hub should not be defined based on proportion of total
passengers carried by an airline, but rather should be based on some threshold of
passengers making connections.
46 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7.
47 Id. at 17-18.
48 Id.
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airports.49 In the analysis, the DOT compared routes of similar
distance in an attempt to control for distance. 50 Using this
methodology, the DOT estimated an average hub premium of
18.7% for airports dominated by one airline and an average pre-
mium of 8.9% for airports dominated by two airlines.51
Before proceeding, it is worth commenting on an argument
put forth by a few researchers that the methodology employed
the GAO and the DOT could hide fare premiums in certain in-
stances. This argument is based on the fact that the GAO and
the DOT methodologies separate airports into those that are
deemed to be concentrated and those that are not.5 2 If entry
occurs at an airport that is concentrated, the decline in market
share of the dominant carrier could result in the hub changing
classification to that of not concentrated.5 3 In the hypothetical
case that the entrant's fare is the same as that of the incumbent,
then the measure of concentration at the airports served will fall
without any change in. the airport's average fare level.54 As a
result, it is possible that the average fare at concentrated hubs
could decrease when they move from one category to the other,
while the average fare at unconcentrated airports could in-
crease, reducing the estimated hub premium even though there
was no change in fares paid. This is a hypothetical argument that
is not empirically established.56 While conceptually possible, it
requires the challenging assumption that entry would occur, suf-
ficient to lower the concentration ratio, without any fall in aver-
age fares.57
B. OTHER FACTORS MAY INFLUENCE THE LEVEL OF FAREs AT
HUB AIRPORTS
The general ,conclusion from early research was that airport
concentration led to charging premiums to passengers with an
49 PRICING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 3.
50 Id. at 12.
51 Id. at 12-13. The DoT's defined a hub as concentrated if one carrier had
more than 75% of enplanements, a different criteria to the 1990 GAO study.
52 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7; PRICING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
supra note 3.
53 Gloria J. Hurdle et al., Concentration, Potential Entry, and Perfomnance in the







origin and/or destination at a hub airports 8.5  However, subse-
quent research pointed out that these studies made little at-
tempt to adjust for other factors that impact average fares paid,
such as traffic-mix, carrier identity and unit-cost differences.
For example, hub airports may have a higher proportion of busi-
ness travelers who typically pay higher fares than non-hub air-
ports because hub airports tend to be based near major cities. 60
Thus, any observed hub premium may simply be due to the
characteristics of travel demand at hub cities, rather than to
market dominance." The DOT study controlled for route dis-
tance and found a lower hub premium.62
This led researchers to use more sophisticated econometric
models in order to more fully control for factors other than
market concentration that could explain higher fares for trips to
and from hub cities."3 Some of these factors included character-
istics of the airport itself or the community served by the hub
airport."4 One factor already identified by the DOT study is dis-
tance or stage-length of a route."5 Substantial costs are incurred
in getting an aircraft off the ground to cruising altitude, and
then getting it back down again.66 This is due to the physics of
getting a heavy object into the air, as well as to economic factors
such as landing fees, which do not vary with the stage-length of a
flight. Short routes will thus have higher costs per mile than
longer routes, which can spread these fixed costs over more kilo-
meters. This is relevant for measuring any hub premium, since
routes from hubs are typically shorter than non-hub routes. The
latter will often include many long transcontinental flights.
Hubs, on the other hand, are generally located more centrally
and, at least in the United States, have a preponderance of short
and medium-haul routes. Thus, any observed hub premium
may simply be a result of shorter route distances, rather than
exploiting market dominance.
58 Abunassar & Koford, supra note 16, at 373.
5" ECONOMIc EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 5, at 62.
60 Id.
61 Ito & Lee, supra note 30, at 14.
62 PRICING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 11.
63 Borentein, supra note 8. While it is not the purpose of this paper to provide
detailed commentary on the econometric techniques used, we note that most
researchers used two-stage or ordinary least squares regression analysis.
"4 Ito & Lee, supra note 30, at 14.
65 PRICING; EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 11.
-' There are also costs associated with processing passengers before and after
the flight, which do not vary with distance.
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Another important factor affecting fares at some major air-
ports is congestion. Economic scarcity, rather than market
power per se, may be a source of fare premiums at hub airports.6 7
Limitations on airport capacity can generate scarcity rents that
accrue to all airlines using the congested airport, not only to the
dominant airlines.
68
One of the first studies to attempt to account for these factors,
and one that became highly influential in the hub-premium de-
bate, was Borenstein's 1989 study.69 Borenstein estimated an
econometric model that related the median route fare charged
by each airline to a number of operational and market factors,
such as route distance, unit-costs, traffic-mix, carrier identity and
airport constraints, route concentration and airport concentra-
tion. 70 This analysis found a statistically significant impact of air-
port concentration on fare.7 ' For example, based on
Borenstein's analysis, a carrier with a traffic share of 50% at both
endpoints of a route is able to charge 12% higher fares than a
carrier with only a 10% share at each endpoint.72 While Boren-
stein's research demonstrated a statistically significant hub pre-
mium associated with airport concentration, he did not estimate
the scale of the premium experienced at dominated hubs. He
did not produce a figure that can be directly compared with the
27.2% and 18.7% premiums estimated by the GAO and DOT,
respectively. 73 The 12% figure is based on a hypothetical situa-
tion which may or may not reflect the concentration levels at
airports at the time of the analysis. 4
67 Id. at 25.
68 Id.
69 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 347.
70 Id. at 348-51. Borenstein's 1989 study, like most of the econometric analysis
that followed, included variables to differentiate between route and airport domi-
nance. For example, an airline could dominate a given route as it carries most of
the traffic on the route, but represent only a fraction of the total traffic at the
endpoint airports, and so would not dominate the airport. This analysis provided
an estimate of the premium achieved by dominating an airport separate to that
that could be achieved by dominating a route.
71 Id. at 362.
72 Id. at 360. This premium is based on the combined impact of airport domi-
nance and route dominance. Id. at 358. Borenstein assumes, not unreasonably,
that an increase in airport dominance is associated with an increase in route
dominance such that each 1% increase in the share of originations at the airport
causes an increase in route share of up to 0.33%, depending on existing route
share. Id.
73 Id.; see supra notes 44, 51 and accompanying text.
74 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 360. A similar analysis was carried out in 1993 by
Evans and Kessides (1993). William N. Evans & Loannis N. Kessides, Localized
476
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An important methodological improvement of Borenstein's
1989 research is that he controlled for the set of routes at the
airport.75 The 1990 GAO study simply computed the average
yield across all airlines at an airport for whatever set of domestic
routes were served. 7' Borenstein looked at the average fare of a
specific carrier on a specific route and asked whether that car-
rier charged a premium on routes serving an airport that the
carrier dominated. 77
In 1989, Hurdle and others examined the impact of potential
entry on yields on routes operated from major air carrier hubs. 8
While the analysis did not estimate a hub premium per se, it did
indicate that potential entry moderated fares levels. 79 The au-
thors regressed average route yield against distance, route mar-
ket concentration and a measure of the "likely potential
entrants" on the route. 8' The analysis found that a reduction in
the number of carriers on a route increased yields on the route;
for example, a reduction from two to one carrier on a route
Marked Power in the U.S. Airline Industry, 75 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 66 (1993).
Controlling for distance, airline and route characteristics (through dummy vari-
ables which captured, in part, traffic mix effects), the authors still found a statisti-
cally significant premium associated with airport concentration, but, like
Borenstein, the authors did not provide an estimate of the hub premium. Id. at
67-68, 71.
75 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 357.
76 U.S. GEN. ACcOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 33. In a later paper, Boren-
stein (1990) carried out a before-and-after fares analysis of the TWA/Ozark and
Northwest/Republic mergers, both of which occurred in 1986. Severin Boren-
stein, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power, 80 Am. ECON. J. 400,
400-01 (1990). Although the analysis was less sophisticated than his 1989 analysis,
it still controlled for distance. Id. Borenstein found that fares on routes from
Minneapolis St. Paul had increased 9.5% following the Northwest/Republic but
found no conclusive evidence of a fares increase following the TWA!Ozark
merger. Id.
Borenstein, supra note 8, at 354. It is worth noting that Borenstein's defini-
tion of a hub premium differs from that assumed by the GAO and that of the
DoT. In essence, Borenstein estimated the hub premium charged by the domi-
nant airline relative to airlines without airport dominance, while the previous
studies estimated the degree to which the average fare at a concentrated hub
(across all airlines) differs from average fare at unconcentrated airports (i.e., it is
not specific to the dominant airline). Id. at 355. Most of the research subsequent
to Borenstein follows his definition with the exception of Simat, Helliesen and
Eichner (1989) and Abunassar and Koford (1994). U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, supra note 7, at 34; PRICING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 12; Simat,
Helliesen, & Eichner, supra note 21; Abunasser & Koford, supra note 16, at 369.
78 Hurdle, supra note 53, at 119-22.
79 Id. at 137.
80 Id. at 122-24. The measure of likely potential entrants was based on the
number of large carriers at the route endpoints currently not serving the route.
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increased average route yields by 12 to 33%.81 The analysis also
found that the number of likely potential entrants had a signifi-
cant negative effect on yields, provided they were large enough
to overcome economies of scale and scope enjoyed by the in-
cumbent. 82 However, the hypothesis that all city-pair markets
are perfectly contestable was rejected.83
Another attempt to control for various other factors on airline
prices was carried out in 1989 by Simat, Helliesen and Eichner
for the Air Transport Association. 84 The study involved stepwise
regression analysis of the factors determining fares, such as traf-
fic-mix and airport characteristics, using data from 30 hub and
30 non-hub airports. 85 The results of the regression found that
the leading carrier's market share at an airport had no signifi-
cant impact on fares. 86 The technical specification of the regres-
sion analysis was criticized in a 1994 paper by Abunassar and
Koford, due to the absence of certain variables and citing evi-
dence of multicolinearity. 87 Abunassar and Koford estimated a
revised version of the regression model that corrected for these
problems.8 8 Their revised estimation indicated that monopoly
dominance of an airport resulted in fares 10% higher, relative
to an unconcentrated airport.89
III. The Low Cost Carrier Effect
Both the Simat, Helliesen and Eichner study and the revised
analysis by Abunassar and Koford included a variable capturing
the impact of the presence of a low cost carrier (LCC) at the
airport." As the analysis was based on 1989 data, this largely
meant the impact of Southwest but did include some other air-
81 Id. at 131-32.
82 Id. at 137.
83 Id.
84 Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, supra note 21.
85 Id.
86 Id. The authors also undertook a simple comparison of hub and non-hub
averages fares and found that hub fares were 2.2% to 3.8% above non-hub fares -
a small difference. Id.
87 Abunassar & Koford, supra note 16, at 369.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 373. The 10% finding is based on the difference between an airport
served by 10 equal sized air carriers versus an airport served by a monopolist air
carrier. Id.
90 Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, supra note 21; Abunassar & Koford, supra note
16, at 368.
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lines fitting the same business model.9 ' Both studies found that
the presence of an LCC had a significant downward influence
on fares.' Both papers produced similar results, finding that
the LCC reduces fares by as much as 40%Y9 While this was a
secondary focus of the papers, it is interesting that the impact of
the LCC was found to be four times the impact of airport
concentration. -4
In 1992, Dresner and Windle carried out an alternative form
of analysis, comparing yields on flights to a hub with yields on
flights from a hub.9" The contention of the paper was that, if
market power was being exercised, yields on the flights from the
hub would be higher than yields to the hub.97 The analysis,
which controlled for distance and airport characteristics, indi-
cated the presence of a small hub premium.98 The example
they give is that a 28% higher airport market share at the origin
airport leads to a 1% to 2% premium on yields.99 The authors
characterized this premium as small but statistically significant
and postulated that it was due to the higher proportion of busi-
ness travelers at hub airports.'
91 Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, supra note 21; Abunassar & Koford, supra note
16, at 368.
92 Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, supra note 21; Abunassar & Koford, supra note
16, at 372.
93 Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, supra note 21; Abunassar & Koford, supra note
16, at 372. The 40% finding is based on a hypothetical case of the LCC serving
100% of enplanements at the airport. Id. For lower LCC shares, the impact of its
presence is proportionately less. Abunassar & Koford, supra note 16, at 371, 373.
94 Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, supra note 21. The analysis is complicated be-
cause as the LCC share increases, the dominant air carrier effect presumably
would also apply, resulting in a lower net impact of the LCC, presumably a net
impact of only--30%. Abunassar & Koford, supra note 16, at 371.
95 Martin Dresner & Robert Windle, Airport Dominance and Yields in the U.S.
Airline Indusoy, 28 LoGisrics TRANSP. REv. 319, 319-20 (1992).
96 Id. at 320.
97 Id. at 334. The concept seems to be that residents at a hub would be subject
to exploitation of any market power available, as most destinations they wished to
reach were served by the dominant carrier. Id. Those residents elsewhere would
presumably have other choices for much of their flying. Id.
98 Id. at 329.
99 Id.
100 In 1993, Windle and Dresner also examined the hub premium at a monop-
oly hub versus a duopoly hub. Id. at 334. They found that, on average, monopoly
hubs had a 2.8% fares premium over duopoly hubs. Robert Windle & Martin
Dresner, Competition at "Duopoly" Airline Hubs, in the U.S., 33 TRANSP. J. 22, 29
(1993).
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A. OTHER STUDIES THAT CONTROL FOR VARIOUS MARKET
FACTORS IN THE ANALYSIS
A number of studies followed Borenstein's 1989 study. 10 1 In
their widely cited book, The Evolution of the Airline Industry, Mor-
rison and Winston argue that some of the previous analysis had
not fully accounted for traffic mix, °2 distance, frequent flier
tickets, carrier identity and connecting services.'0 3 Frequent
flier tickets had generally been excluded from previous analyses
but Morrison and Winston argue that they should be included
as, in their view, frequent flier travel represents, effectively, a
discount on travel.10 4 For example, the 1990 GAO study filtered
out zero-fare tickets used for frequent flier reward travel, possi-
bly biasing upwards the fare premium estimate at concentrated
hubs." 5
Another overlooked factor is carrier identity. According to
Morrison and Winston, Delta may charge higher fares at its hub
in Atlanta, because it charges higher fares at all the airports it
serves, and, thus, the premium observed at the concentrated
hub might be a service-quality premium, 0 6 rather than a mani-
festation of market power. 10 7 Hubs also tend to have a greater
101 Abunassar & Koford, supra note 16, at 363, 369; THE EVOLUTION OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 16, at 46.
102 THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 16, at 46. Traffic mix
refers to factors such as the amount of travel that is for business purposes versus
leisure or visiting friends and relatives. One reviewer observed to the authors of
this paper that observing a high proportion of usage of "business fares" does not
constitute unambiguous evidence that there is a high proportion of travel for
business purposes, since an airline with market power might be able to force
other travellers into the higher and more flexible fare categories. Id. Travel in-
tentions data would need to be used to unambiguously address this issue. Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 48-49, 53.
105 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 51. The argument for bias is
that at concentrated hubs, residents are more likely to do all or most of their
travel on the dominant carrier, and thus qualify more often for frequent flyer
reward tickets, a form of quantity discount. Id. At an unconcentrated hub (or at
spoke ends), travelers may need to disperse their travel among several airlines
reducing their ability earn and use frequent flyer reward tickets. Id.
106 THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 16, at 46. Borenstein
(1999) observed that a service quality premium would be sustained in a competi-
tive market only if it is more costly to provide. Severin Borenstein, Hub Domi-
nance & Pricing 3 (Jan. 21, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). The academic literature does not address empirical issue of whether the
higher quality services, such as high frequency, service redundancy, and rapid
flight connections, of many hub carriers are more costly to provide. Id.
107 THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 16, at 46-47. The gen-
eral (as opposed to hub) premium charged by some air carriers may reflect a
480
AIRLINE PRICES
proportion of non-stop trips than non-hubs."" Since trips re-
quiring a connection are less attractive to travelers, they are
likely to have a lower fare. Again, the hub premium may simply
be a reflection of a higher-quality service.
To illustrate their point, the authors compared the hub pre-
mium estimated using the simple methodology in the 1990
GAO study with a similar approach that controlled for the fac-
tors discussed above."0 9 Using DBla data from 1978 to 1993, the
authors compared yields at fifteen hub airports and yields at a
control group of twenty-seven unconcentrated non-hub air-
ports." 0 Through this analysis, the hub premium was estimated
to be only 5.2% in 1993, having ranged from 4% to 10% be-
tween 1978 and 1993.111 Applying the GAO's methodology (a
straight comparison of hub and non-hub fares with no adjust-
ment for the factors above), the hub premium was calculated to
be 33.4% in 1993.112 Thus, their work could both replicate the
GAO's findings as well as explain away much of what was
thought to be a hub premium. The authors explain the 28.2
percentage point difference between the GAO's estimate and
their own as follows:
* 18.6 percentage points were due to distance and non-stop ver-
sus connecting flights;
* 4.6 percentage points were due to airline-specific effects;
* 2.5 percentage points were due to the frequent flier
adjustment;
* 2.5 percentage points were due to the exclusion of nine tour-
ism-heavy airports from the control group (effectively adjust-
ing for traffic mix by comparing business hub airports with
business non-hub airports).113
The authors contend that the hub premium is much smaller
than previously reported, and, even with the premium, fares
were substantially below the levels that occurred before deregu-
higher service quality it offers (such as higher in flight service, higher flight relia-
bility, greater redundancy of service, etc). It may also reflect a brand premium.
Presumably a market power premium would be attributed only if the premium is
found on concentrated routes and not on all routes served by the carrier. Morri-
son and Winston seem to suggest that the general premium revealed by a firnm
dummy variable is not a market power premium. Id.
108 Id. at 46.
109 Id. at 46-47.
110 Id. at 47-48.
III Id. at 48.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 48-49.
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lation." 4 Morrison and Winston were able to adapt the method-
ology used by the GAO to control for a number of factors that
might affect fares at hub airports and isolate the effect of airport
concentration."' Although Morrison and Winston's analysis
lacked the sophisticated economic approach of some studies, it
is similar to Borenstein's 1989 analysis.
In 1997, Morrison further demonstrated the need to control
for other factors, in particular LCCs, when estimating the hub
premium." 6 Using DBla data from 1996, Morrison compared
the average fare at eleven concentrated airports with the average
fare across all airports in the United States. 17 This simple com-
parison produced a hub premium estimate of 22%.118 However,
simply by removing airports served by Southwest from the con-
trol group, the fares at the concentrated airports were found to
be 6% lower than the remaining airports." 9 While this analysis
lacked the sophistication of other research papers as, for exam-
ple, it did not control for variables such as distance, traffic mix
and frequent flier travel, it clearly demonstrated the importance
of controlling for other factors. Morrison also found that fares
at airports served by Southwest were, on average, 39% lower
than fares at airports not served by Southwest. 121
B. CONTROLS AND LCC EFFECTS
A 2003 paper by Lee and Luengo-Prado controlled for many
of these same factors and, in addition, examined the impact of
LCCs. 12 1 They estimated a regression model of average route
yield that controlled for distance, traffic density, traffic mix,
presence of an LCC, and other operational factors (the analysis
did not incorporate frequent flier tickets)122 Their analysis was
114 Id. at 49.
115 Id. at 47.
116 Airline Deregulation in Fares at Dominated Hubs and Slot-Controlled Airports:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (Nov. 5, 1997) (statement
of Steven Morrison, Professor of Economics, Northeastern University) [hereinaf-
ter Morrison Statement].
117 Id. at 1-2.
118 Id. at 2.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 3.
121 Darin Lee & Maria Jose Luengo-Prado, The Impact of Passenger Mix on Re-
ported "Hub Premiums" in the U.S. Airline Industry, S. ECON. J. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 11, on file with authors), available at http://www.darinlee.net/
research.html.
122 Id. at 4, 5, 10, 11.
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able to estimate hub premiums for individual hub airports. 2 '
The premiums ranged from -5% at Miami to 31% at Newark.' 24
The overall average premium for coach fares was 12%, while the
average premium for other fares was 13%. 125 The analysis also
found that the presence of an LCC on a route reduced coach
fares by as much 14% and also premium fares by 6%.126
Finally, a 2004 paper by Hofer, Dresner and Windle investi-
gated whether LCCs affect the network carrier's ability to capi-
talize on market concentration and power, and whether LCCs
earn hub premiums.' 27 The authors estimated a regression
model of average fares on the top 1,000 routes in 1993, 1997
and 2002.128 They concluded that market concentration and
airport market power are positively correlated with average
fares, that the presence of an LCC reduces fares in a market,
and that LCC presence consistently lowers hub premiums. 129
They also found that LCCs appear to earn little or no hub pre-
mium at airports where they are the dominant carrier. 3 1
Hofer, Dresner, and Windle provide two conclusions that
summarize the results of fifteen years of research into the issue
of hub premiums:
* "Hub premiums are less of an issue today than they were in the
earlier stages of hub premiums research and, therefore, may
not warrant regulatory intervention.
" Average fares and hub premiums will likely decrease in the fu-
ture, as LCCs expand their operations and continue to chal-
lenge established network carriers."' 3 '
Despite this recent research, the DOT maintains that there is
a substantial and problematic hub premium, referring to hubs
as "pockets of pain" in a 2001 report, and rejects many of the
arguments to the contrary.'3 2 In 2001, the DOT argued that pas-
123 Id. at 7, 8, 21, 22.
124 ld. at 30.
125 id. at 15-16.
126 Id. at 30.
127 Christian Hofer, Martin Dresner, & Robert Windle, Hub Premiums in an
Era of Low-Cost Carriers and Financial Distress, Address at the 2004 Air Trans-
port Research Society World Converence in Istanbul, Turkey (July 2, 2004) [here-





132 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AVIATION AND INT'L AFFAIRS, DOMI-
NATED HuB FARES 21 (2001).
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senger-mix or the "Southwest effect" are not factors that explain
away the hub premium, but rather are symptoms of the prob-
lem. 1 3 The DOT's main contention is that average fares have
consistently declined at major hubs following entry by an LCC,
such as Southwest, indicating that the hub carrier was exploiting
its monopoly position prior to the LCC's arrival.1"4 This is a pos-
sibility, but it denies the findings that part of the hub premium
may be due to service-quality differences, such as non-stop ver-
sus connecting flights or frequent flyer reward travel as a form
of quantity discount. If the DOT view is true, it does appear the
hub premium problem is one that has been corrected to a large
extent by market forces.
The issue of the hub premium continues to be controversial,
but it appears that some conclusions can be drawn after more
than fifteen years of research. Early studies found substantial
premiums at hubs. 135 However, subsequent research showed
that these failed to control for other factors, such as traffic-mix,
frequent flyer reward tickets, low cost carriers and distance."3 6
More recent studies have attempted to control for these factors
and have revealed a smaller premium. 137 The investigation of
hub premiums has also revealed that another factor was influ-
encing fares paid. That is whether a low cost carrier such as
Southwest is present in the market. 1 3  While this was of secon-
dary interest in the original development of the literature, the
research results indicated that the LCC effect was large, poten-
tially as important as hub premiums in explaining differences in
air fares in different markets.'3 9 The next section examines the
literature on the LCC effect.
133 Id. at 11.
134 Id. at 11-12.
135 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 355-56; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, sup-a
note 7, at 32-34.
136 THE EVALUATION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 16, at 46.
137 Lee & Luengo-Prado, supra note 121, at 7.
138 Morrison Statement, supra note 116, at 2. Much of the research into the
LCC phenomena refers to the "Southwest Effect" as it is by the far the largest and
long-lived of the LCCs. Id.
139 DOMINATED HUB FARES, supra note 132, at 11.
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C. IMPACT OF THE Low COST CARRIERS ON AVERAGE AIR FARE
ON A ROUTE
In 1993, Bennett and Craun of the DOT published a report
charting the rise of Southwest Airlines. 4 ' The authors charac-
terized Southwest as focused on short-haul, high-density mar-
kets, offering point-to-point service, with unit costs one-half to
two-thirds of its network carrier competitors.' 4 ' They found that
routes served by Southwest had average fares 49-56% lower than
similar-length routes without Southwest service. 142 They also de-
scribed Southwest's impact on the California corridor, from San
Francisco to Los Angeles. 143 Operating out of Oakland, the car-
rier started service to Los Angeles International, Los Angeles
Ontario, and Los Angeles Burbank.
44
From the 1989 start of these routes, Southwest's traffic grew
dramatically, to the point where it became the largest carrier in
the corridor with a 42% traffic share, despite not serving San
Francisco International Airport. 4 5 Average fares (across all air-
lines) on the Oakland-Ontario route declined by 60%, and traf-
fic trebled after Southwest entered. 116 In addition, average fares
also declined on parallel, competing routes that Southwest did
not serve, such as San Francisco-Los Angeles, resulting in in-
creased traffic on those routes.'4 7 The research observed that
many airlines eventually exited the market, unable to compete
alongside Southwest. 48 Remarkably, the authors raised con-
cerns that Southwest's success may result in it being a monopoly
carrier in many markets and that government policy needs to
encourage new LCC entry to discipline Southwest. 14 9
In 1995, Windle and Dresner examined the impact of LCC-
entry on fares and traffic levels on a route and considered
140 Randall Bennett & James Craun, U.S. Dep't of Transp., The Southwest Effect
3-21 (1993). Southwest first flew in November 1971. For a colourful account of
the rise of the carrier, see KEVIN FRIEBERG & JACKIE FREIBERG, NUTS!: SOUTHWEST
AIRLINES' CRAZY RECIPE FOR BUSINESS AND PERSONAL SUCCESS 15 (Bard Press
1996).
141 Bennett & Craun, supra note 140, at 3.
142 Id. at 12-13.
143 Id. at 6, 14-19.
144 Id. at 6.
145 Id. at 6, 7, 14.
146 Id. at 7.
147 Id. at 9.
148 Id. at 7.
149 Id. at 9.
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whether the impact differed from entry by a network carrier. 5 '
They also examined whether the fare and traffic effects contin-
ued past an initial "promotional" period after the carrier en-
tered the market.' 51 Computing changes in average fares
(averaged over all routes with entry),for the four quarters before
and after entry, they found that, on average, route fares de-
clined by 12% immediately following entry by a network carrier
and, one year later, increased to reach a fare-level that was 5%
below the pre-entry level. 152 Traffic was 17% above pre-entry
levels one year after entry.'53 By contrast, entry by Southwest
reduced the average route-fare by 48% and remained close to
that level over the ensuing four quarters.'54 Traffic levels on
these routes increased by 200%, on average, one year after en-
try.'55 The impact of other non-network carriers were less dra-
matic than Southwest but larger than the network carriers; fares
declined by 20% one year after entry, and traffic increased by
50%.116 The authors also observed that, if the entrant later ex-
ited the market, average route fares did not increase, and traffic
levels remained at pre-exit levels.15
7
In a 1996 study, Dresner, Lin and Windle further examined
the impact on fares resulting from the entry of an LCC.1 58 Their
research examined not only the impact on fares on the route
entered, but also the impact on fares on other routes from the
same airport and on parallel routes from nearby airports.
59
The authors examined Southwest's entry into Baltimore/Wash-
ington airport (BWI), flying to Cleveland and Chicago Mid-
150 Robert Windle & Martin Dresner, The Short and Long Run Effect of Entry on
U.S. Domestic Air Routes, 35 TRANsP. J. 14 (1995).
151 Id. at 14.
152 Id. at 17-18.
153 Id. at 19.
154 Id. at 18.
155 Id. at 19.
156 Id. at 18-19.
157 Id. at 20. In the same paper, the authors formalized their findings using a
regression model which related average route fare to distance, route concentra-
tion, other market factors and airline specific dummy variables. Id. The regres-
sion analysis also found that the presence LCCs, such as Southwest, on a route
had a much larger impact of fares than any network carrier. The impact of car-
rier identity were so large as to make the coefficient on route concentration insig-
nificant, therefore, the identity of the carriers on the route is more important
than the number of carriers on a route or their market share. Id.
158 Martin Dresner, Jiun-Sheng Chris Lin & Robert Windle, The Impact of Low-





way.'"" Dresner, Lin and Windle found that average fares on the
Southwest routes from BWI declined by 60-75%, and that fares
on other routes from BWI not operated by Southwest declined
by 18-40%."' The effect was more pronounced on routes of a
similar length to those operated by Southwest." 2 They also ob-
served fare reductions at nearby Washington Dulles and Na-
tional airports on routes to Ohio and Chicago, though the
reductions were modest.'63
The authors carried out regression analysis to produce more
generalized results and to control for other factors that affect
fares.'64 Using data on route yields rather than average fares,
they found that entry by an LCC onto a route reduced average
route yields by 38%.165 If the LCC was Southwest, yields were
reduced by 53% - a larger impact than the average LCC. 1' En-
try of an LCC at an airport reduced yields by 41% on routes not
served by the LCC, with reductions in yields being larger the
greater the number of routes the LCC operated from that air-
port.'67 The authors concluded that the influence of LCCs ex-
tended beyond the routes they served and impacted other
airports." 8
In 2001, Morrison also examined the impact of LCC entry,
specifically entry by Southwest, on other routes from the same
airport (referred to as "potential competition") and on compet-
ing parallel routes from nearby airports (referred to as "adjacent
competition")." 9 Using data from 1998, the authors used a re-
gression model to analyze the correlation between (1) the aver-
age fare on a route to distance, (2) number of carriers on the
route, (3) other market factors, and (4) dummies indicating
whether Southwest operated on the route, on a competing
route, or from the same airport. 170 The analysis found that
-6o Id. at 312.
161 Id. at 313, 314, 316, 317.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 314.
164 Id. at 319. While their analysis of fares before and after entry examined
impacts on parallel routes from nearby airports, the regression analysis did not
do so, examining only the impact on other routes from the same airport. Id.
165 Id. at 326.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 327.
168 Id.
169 Severin Morrison, Actual Adjacent & Potential Competition Estimating the Full
Effect of Southwest Airlines, 35 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y. 240-41 (2001).
170 Id. at 243, 245-47.
2005] 487
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Southwest's presence as a potential competition on a route re-
duced fares by an average of 46% and that Southwest's presence
on a competing parallel route as an adjacent competitor re-
duced average fares by between 15% and 26%, depending on
route characteristics.'71 Southwest's presence at either endpoint
airport reduced the average route fare by between 6% and 13%,
while Southwest's presence at both endpoints reduced average
fares by 33%.172 The analysis also included a dummy variable
that indicated whether either endpoint airport was dominated
by one airline - determined by whether one airline accounted
for 60% or more of enplanements - and found that airport
dominance increased fares by 4%.17' This analysis suggests that,
in general, the competitive impact of entry by an LCC greatly
outweighs any monopoly pricing power enjoyed by dominant
hub airlines. Morrison took the analysis one stage further to
estimate the total annual savings to travelers of Southwest's pres-
ence. 174 In 1998, Southwest was estimated to induce $12.9 bil-
lion in savings to travelers per annum, $9.6 billion of which was
due to actual and adjacent competition and $3.3 billion due to
potential competition.1 75
In 2001, Vowles also examined the impact of Southwest's en-
try into an airport on fares on competing routes at other nearby
airports with no Southwest service. 176 For example, the average
fare on the Chicago O'Hare-Columbus route before and after
the startup of Southwest's Chicago Midway-Columbus service. 177
The analysis found that, in general, airports near an airport that
Southwest enters also experience a decline in average air
fares. 171 Of forty-seven routes examined, thirty-six induced a re-
duction in average fares at a nearby airport. 79 Vowles also
found that, generally, the airports that lowered fares did not ex-
perience an increase in traffic; rather, the lowered fares were
required to maintain or to avoid a significant reduction in traffic
levels due to competition from Southwest.18 0
171 Id. at 249.
172 Id. at 249-50.
173 Id. at 247-48.
174 Id. at 250.
175 Id. at 253-54; Timothy M. Vowles, The Southwest Effect in Multi-Airport Regions,
7J. A]R TRANSPORT MGMT. 251-58 (2001).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 253.
178 Id. at 251-52.
179 Id. at 252.
180 Id.
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from the literature.
First, there is a consensus that the entry or presence of an LCC
on a route, particularly Southwest, results in a dramatic and per-
manent reduction in fares. Second, the influence of the LCC
appears to extend beyond the routes it operates. Average fares
for other routes operated from the same airports, or even
nearby airports, have declined, despite having no LCC service.
Third, the impact of the presence of an LCC on a route is very
large and generally exceeds the effects found in the preceding
section for hub dominance.
Given the findings of the sizeable impact of LCCs on average
fares paid by consumers, additional research has been carried
out to explore what induces an LCC to enter a route, how the
incumbent airlines react to the entry of a new carrier, and how
that reaction impacts the entrant.1"' These are the subjects of
the next two sections.
IV. FACTORS AFFECTING ENTRY BY A NEW CARRIER
A number of research studies have explored market condi-
tions under which LCCs and other carriers will enter a route.18 2
In 1990, Morrison and Winston examined the factors that affect
route entry and exit decisions of network carriers and LCCs. 83
Using data from 1979 to 1988 on thirteen domestic airlines, the
authors estimated probit models of route entry and route
exit.'8 4 The route entry model related the probability of entry
to the airline's market share at the origin and destination air-
ports (percentage of departures), the same market share of the
largest competitor airline, average route yield relative to other
routes of similar distance, population at the origin and destina-
tion and a dummy indicating a slot-constrained airport at either
endpoint.18 5 The route exit model related probability of exit to
the same variables.1 8
6
181 See Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, supra note 30, at 391; see also
Martin Dresner and Robert Windle, Competition Responses to Low Cost Carrier Entry
on U.S. Domestic Air Routes, 35 LOGISTICS & TRANSP. Riv. 60 (1999).
182 Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, supra note 30, at 391; Ito & Lee,
supra note 30. Covering a related area, Kling, Grimm and Corsi analysed the
success of various entry strategies for air carriers entering a dominated hub.
James A. Kling et al., Hub-Dominated Airports: An Empirical Assessment of Challenger
Strategies, 27 LoGIsrIcS & TRANSP. REv. 203 (1991).
183 Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, supra note 30.




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The route entry model for both network carriers and LCCs
found that the carrier's own airport network size, as measured
by the market share at the origin and destination airports, had
the largest influence on route entry.18 7 However, a competitor's
airport network size had no significant impact on entry deci-
sions.""8 The analysis also showed that, contrary to the authors'
initial expectations, higher route yields deterred entry."8 9 While
this effect is relatively small, they suggest that high fares may
signal higher costs to operate the route, barriers to entry such as
frequent flier programs, incumbent response or all three. 90
The authors were careful to point out that the findings do not
imply that high-fare routes are immune from entry. 9' Entry can
and does occur from a carrier with a strong network. 192 The
results also showed that slot controls at an airport were found to
be a deterrent to entry.193 The route exit model found similar
results as the route entry model, but of opposite sign, suggesting
market symmetry.194 This includes the paradoxical impact of
high fares.
Over a decade later in 2003, Ito and Lee examined the factors
affecting route entry decisions by LCCs 195 and estimated a
probit model of LCC entry.'96 The estimation related the
probability of LCC entry onto a route to route-traffic density,
distance, route and airport concentration, price before entry
and other market factors.'97 The estimation results indicated
that traffic density and pre-entry price were the most important
factors in deciding entry, both having a positive impact on the
probability of entry.' 98 Income and population had a negative
impact on the probability of entry,' 99 suggesting that LCCs tend
to avoid large metropolitan areas and large business centres in
favour of secondary airports. The presence of a network hub at
187 Id. at 391.
188 Id. at 391-92.






195 Ito & Lee, supra note 30, at 7 (estimating the benefits of removing the se-
vere restrictions on markets which could be served from Dallas Love Field).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 9-11.
198 Id. at 13.
199 Id. at 14.
490
AIRLINE PRICES
either route endpoint reduced the probability of LCC entry, as
did airport congestion .211 ' The variables relating to route and
airport concentration were not significant"" suggesting that pre-
existing competitive factors do not play an important role in
LCC entry decisions.
The model was also used to estimate the extent of LCC entry
in the future, by applying the model to a large selection of
routes currently without LCC service. 2 The model estimated
an additional 24% of network carrier domestic revenues could
be exposed to LCC competition, increasing their total revenue
exposure from 32% in 2002 to 56% in long-term. 20 3
V. INCUMBENT RESPONSE TO LCC ENTRY
Given the importance of LCC entry for the average air fare
paid by consumers, the issue of incumbent response to LCC en-
try has received some recent attention.2 4 In 1999, Windle and
Dresner examined how incumbent carriers responded to entry
by an LCC. -, 5 Their paper responded to the 1996 research by
the DOT, which examined the impact of LCC entry on Delta
Airlines' fares at its hubs in Atlanta and Salt Lake City.""1 The
DOT found that Delta charged lower fares on routes with LCC
competition and higher fares on routes without LCC competi-
tion. 2 07 The DOT suggested the higher fares on the non-LCC
routes were to compensate for losses/reduced profits on the
LCC-affected routes.2 z 8 Windle and Dresner focused on Delta's
response to entry by the LCC, Valujet, at its hub in Atlanta.20 9
The analysis took the form of regression models relating
changes in Delta's yields on individual routes to distance, popu-
lation at the route endpoints and other market factors.2 ' Sepa-
rate models were estimated for routes with and without
200 Id.
201 Id. at 15.
202 Id. at 19.
20" Id. at 25.
204 See, e.g., Windle & Dresher, supra note 150, at 60; Ito & Lee, supra note 30.
A small body of research has also developed on the factors leading to fare wars in
the airline business.
21 5 Windle & Dresner, supra note 150, at 60.
2 Id. at 59.
2072 Executive Pricing Summay, supra note 3, at 14.
21,8 Id. at 16.
2119 Windle & Dresner, supra note 150, at 61. Value et subsequently merged
with another LCC to form Air Tran.
211) Id. at 60-61.
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competition from Valujet, as well as for direct and connecting
markets. 211
The results of the analysis showed that Delta's yields declined
by roughly 25% on routes where ValuJet had entered.21 2 How-
ever, on routes where Delta did not compete with Valujet, yields
were roughly the same and, in some cases, lower.21 3 The au-
thors found no evidence of Delta increasing yields on non-
Valujet routes to compensate for yield reduction on routes with
competition from ValuJet. 214 In Windle and Dresner's view, this
supports the argument that airlines practice rational economic
pricing on their networks, that carriers do not increase fares on
non-LCC routes as they are already maximizing profit on those
routes.21 5 They suggest that the DOT analysis did not correct
for exogenous and endogenous factors, which may have affected
the results. 216
In a later paper, Lin, Dresner and Windle examined, in a
more generalized .way, incumbent response to entry by a new
carrier. 217 The analysis covered entry by network carriers as well
as LCCs, focusing on the factors affecting the incumbent's fare
response. 218 The difference in the incumbent's fare before and
after entry of another carrier was regressed against the incum-
bent's health and size, the entrant's health and size, the en-
trant's entry strategy and various market factors.219 , On average,
the incumbent's fare declined by 9-10% following successful en-
try by another carrier.220 The regression analysis also indicated
that the lower the entrant's fare was, the greater the incumbent
response; in other words, the incumbent matched the fare be-
havior of the entrant.22 Also, the greater the number of passen-
gers the entrant attracted, the more the incumbent discounted
its fares. 222 However, the incumbent reduced fares less aggres-
sively the lower the unit-cost of the entrant, indicating that the
211 Id.
212 Id. at 65.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 66.
216 Id. at 68.
217 Jiun-Sheng Chris Lin, Martin Dresner & Robert Windle, Determinants of Price
Reactions to Entry in the U.S. Airline Industry, 41 TRANSP. J. 6 (2001).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 11-12.
220 Id. at 14, 16.




incumbent believes price cuts will be less effective against an ef-
ficient carrier with a cost advantage.223 The incumbent dis-
counted less aggressively if the entrant was Southwest or another
non-major carrier than if the entrant was a major network car-
rier.224 Smaller incumbents tended to discount more aggres-
sively.225 The most aggressive discounter was Southwest, 226
indicating that it protects its position as the price leader. The
analysis also found evidence that incumbent fares remained low
even if the entrant later abandoned the routes, possibly to deter
future entry.227
In a second 2003 study, Ito and Lee examined incumbents'
reactions to LCC entry into routes to and from their hubs.228
Using data from 1991 to 2002, they observed that, on average,
the LCC entered a route with a fare 50% less than the incum-
bent's pre-entry fare and provided about one third the capacity
of the incumbent.229 In general, the response of the incumbent
was modest - capacity was increased by 3-4%, on average, and
fares declined by 15%..230 The responses varied by airline; Delta
Air Lines was most aggressive in reducing fares, by an average of
25%, and American Airlines was the least aggressive reducing
fares, by an average of 8%.21
The authors then estimated a probit model examining the in-
cumbent responses most likely to result in the LCC exiting the
market. 232 The probit analysis related the probability of the
LCC's exit from a route to the incumbent's change in capacity
and fare, the LCC's initial capacity and fare, the size of the LCC
in terms of total passengers and other market factors.233 The
analysis found that the incumbent's capacity response had no
impact on the probability of the LCC exiting. However, while
the incumbent's fare response had a negative impact, the larger
the fare reduction, the smaller the probability the LCC would
exit.2 4 The authors suggest that this somewhat surprising result
223 Id.
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indicates that LCCs are more successful in markets that had pre-
existing higher margins.23 5 Overall, the authors found no
strong evidence that an incumbent's capacity expansion or pric-
ing decisions following LCC entry increased the probability that
the LCC would exit the market. 236 Rather, factors relating to
the route and the LCC's own characteristics, such as the pre-
existing market density, the entrant's initial capacity choice and
the LCC's pre-entry presence at the market endpoints of a
route, were more likely to impact their entry and exit
decisions. 23 7
Researches Li Zou, Martin Dresner, and Robert Windle's 2004
study suggests that LCCs demonstrate a very different competi-
tive response to multi-market contact than network carriers.238
The authors test the mutual forbearance theory first put forward
by Edwards in 1955, which states that when two firms meet in
multiple-product or geographic markets, they may hesitate to
contest a given market vigorously for fear of retaliatory attacks in
other markets that would erode prospective gains.23 9 However,
where firms have very different cost structures, this mutual for-
bearance may not apply, as the firm with the cost advantage can
apply that advantage across all markets. 240 Zou, Dresner and
Windle found that network carriers did appear to collude in ac-
cordance to the mutual forbearance theory, as their regression
analysis found that multi-market contact had a positive influ-
ence on network carrier fares. 241 However, increased multi-mar-
ket contact by LCCs had a negative impact on fares.242 The
authors suggest that it is not in an LCC's best interest to collude,
given its lower unit-cost structure.
235 Id. at 21.
236 Id. at 22.
237 Id. at 21.
238 L. Zou, Martin Dresner & Robert Windle, Many Fields a Battle: How Cost
Structures Affect Competition Across Multiple Markets, Address at the 2004 Air
Transport Research Society World Conference in Instanbul, Turkey (July 2,
2004) [hereinafter Many Fields of Battle].
239 Id. (citing C. Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in National
Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report 335 (1995)).
240 Edwards, supra note 239, at 336.




VI. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper has reviewed the literature concering the eco-
nomic effect of market structure on air fares following deregula-
tion of the U.S. airline market, focusing on two related areas -
hub premiums and low cost carriers. Economic literature began
to appear in the 1980s, investigating whether hub dominance
resulted in exploitation of market power by the dominant hub
carrier, a topic that caught the attention of government agen-
cies and the media.243
The initial literature concerning hub dominance found that
fares were higher for trips that originated from concentrated
hub airports. 244 A 1990 study by the GAO suggested that the
hub premium was 27%.245
Some of the early studies did not, however, control for key
market characteristics that might explain why hubs would natu-
rally have higher fares. To address this, researchers began to
estimate statistical regression models with control variables to
separate the effects of market characteristics from the effects of
hub dominance.246 Many later studies found that much of the
premium could be explained by other factors, such as route dis-
tance, traffic mix, the higher value placed by consumers on non-
stop versus connection flights, airport constraints and frequent
flyer tickets. 247 For example, research by Morrison and Winston
found that a 33% hub premium estimated using the GAO meth-
odology was reduced to only 5.2% after accounting for market
characteristics.248
After fifteen years of research, the literature continues to find
that market concentration at hub airports significantly affects av-
erage air fares paid by consumers.249 In recent papers, however,
the magnitude of this effect has been whittled down to single-
243 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 344; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE
COMPETITION: HIGHER FARES & REDUCED COMPETITION AT CONCENTRATED AIR-
PORTS 2 (1990).
244 See, e.g., Borenstein, supra note 8, at 362; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 243, at 3.
245 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 243, at 32.
246 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 349-51; THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDIS-
TRY, supra note 16, at 471.
247 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 362; THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY,
supra note 16, at 48-49.
248 THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 16, at 48.
2441 See, e.g., Lee & Luengo-Prado, supra note 121.
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digit levels.25 ° Other variables were found to be more influential
on the higher fares paid at concentrated hubs.25 I
As researchers continued the investigation of hub premiums,
they began to quantify another post-deregulation phenome-
non--the impact of LCCs on average airline fares paid by con-
sumers. This research on LCCs found that:
" Regardless of market structure, the presence of an LCC has a
dramatic and permanent impact on fares in the market. 252
" An LCC-effect is also present on routes not directly served by
the LCC, such as where it provides service at one or both ends
of the route. This effect is smaller than the direct effect of
LCC presence on a route, but is statistically significant.253
* The LCC-effect is much larger than any hub premium that
might be present in a market. LCC entry, for example, was
credited with reducing average fares by up to 48%.254
* LCCs were not deterred from entering a route by the incum-
bent airline's hub dominance.255
" Dominant airlines at a concentrated hub were largely unable
to use their dominance to force LCCs out of the market once
they had entered, likely due to the lower unit-cost structure
enjoyed by the LCCs. 2 56
While the recent paper by Hofer, Dresner and Windle sug-
gested that hub premiums are less of an issue today,2 5 7 there are
a number of areas that warrant further examination.
First, the literature described above was entirely based on U.S.
data. Industry structure
issues have arisen in Canada, the European Union, Australia,
New Zealand and elsewhere. The U.S. findings, while of interest
to policy makers in these jurisdictions, are not fully transferable.
Not only are there differences in market sizes, but market char-
acteristics also vary, including average route distances, the de-
gree of airport congestion, and entry barriers such foreign
ownership restrictions. It would be worthwhile to examine
whether the same findings would apply elsewhere. This would
250 THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 16, at 48.
251 Borenstein, supra note 8, at 362; THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY,
supra note 16, at 48-49.
252 Lee & Luengo-Prada, supra note 121.
253 Morrison, supra note 169, at 249-50.
254 Robert Windle & Martin Dresner, The Short & Long Run Effects of Entry on
U.S. Domestic Air Routes, 35 TRANsP. J. 19 (1995).
255 Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, supra note 30, at 20-21.
256 Ito & Lee, supra note 30, at 20-21.
257 Low-Cost Carrier Competition and Hub Premiums, supra note 127.
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provide insight into airline policy in those jurisdictions, as well
as test the robustness of the findings from U.S. airline markets.
In part, the lack of research on the effect of market concen-
tration on average airline fares outside the United States is due
to the fact that, in other countries, publicly available data on
individual ticket purchases is difficult to obtain. Very few juris-
dictions have publicly available data similar to the Department
of Transportation's DBla dataset. Foreign studies may require
the use of expensive commercial data, the use of surveys to
gather primary data, or the use of propriety data from govern-
ment agencies or the air carriers themselves. The authors of
this review have conducted some research using commercial
and/or propriety Canadian, European, and Australian data and
indicate that this line of research, while not complete, shows
promise.
Additionally, experiences in other jurisdictions demonstrate
what happens when radical restructuring takes place. Canadian
Airlines was merged into Air Canada, resulting in a market struc-
ture where the resulting dominant carrier had a market revenue
share of close to 90%.258 In Australia, the failure of Ansett re-
sulted in Qantas dominating the market with an unanticipated
90% share in domestic markets. 25 The transitions in these mar-
kets have much to tell economists regarding determinants of av-
erage fares.
Second, LCCs have grown to share over 25% of domestic pas-
sengers carried in the United States and higher shares in Ca-
nada, Australia and the United Kingdom. 2 "° LCCs are also
rapidly increasing market shares in Malaysia, Brazil, Germany
and other countries in the European Union. Some routes and/
or airports are now only served by LCCs. Does this provide
LCCs with the opportunity to extract premiums of their own?
Should the LCCs grow to market shares approaching or possibly
exceeding 50% of traffic carried? Issues of LCC rivalry and the
impact on air fares will be of importance to competition authori-
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vides some initial evidence on this issue, opening a new focus
for research. 26
2
Third, as the LCCs have greatly increased their share of the
air market in the United States, Canada, Australia, Europe, Bra-
zil, Malaysia and elsewhere, some of the large network carriers
have responded by creating pseudo-LCCs subsidiary carriers (or
brands), including Ted (United Airlines), the now defunct ZIP
and Tango (Air Canada), JetStar (Qantas - Australia) and Free-
dom (Air New Zealand). In Europe, British Airways created Go,
and KLM created Buzz, but both of these were eventually sold
and ultimately merged into the LCCs Ryanair and Easyjet, re-
spectively. 26 Do these quasi-LCCs provide the same type of pric-
ing discipline that independent LCCs provide, or are they a
form of incumbent response?
Finally, the existing literature accounts for the effect of LCCs
on average fares in the market, but does not precisely indicate
the effect of an LCC on hub premiums. It would be useful to
have analysis that explicitly controls for whether or not an LCC
is present when determining the existence and/or magnitude of
the concentrated hub premium.
262 Low-Cost Carrier Competition and Hub Premiums, supra note 127.
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